solutions are widely categorized into two kinds: informationtheoretic and cryptographic. Existing information-theoretic schemes, not relying on any computational assumptions, only offer relatively limited pollution detection/correction at receivers in an end-to-end fashion [3] . Hence, it cannot help the forwarders to prevent the transmission of useless polluted packets. In contrast, cryptography-based schemes enable the forwarders to verify the veracity of their received packets en route and hence reject ill-formed packets before polluting the downstream flows. Two typical representatives of cryptographic schemes that have been proposed to thwart pollution attacks for network coding are public-key cryptography (PKC)-based approaches and symmetric-key cryptography-based approaches.
Several PKC cryptographic schemes for pollution attacks have been presented using homomorphic PKC cryptography [4] , [5] . However, all of these schemes involve expensive arithmetic operations over a large extension field, which results in substantial computational delays and performance degradation. To mitigate the computational cost, the solutions using symmetric cryptography have received widespread attention. Yu and others [6] constructed multiple message authentication codes (MACs) based on probabilistic key predistribution for all verifiers. Agrawal and Boneh [7] proposed two homomorphic MACs, and only the receivers in their basic scheme are able to verify data packets, whereas their broadcast homomorphic MAC scheme can detect pollution attacks using the technique of cover-free family for key predistribution. Similar schemes were subsequently presented in [6] , [8] . Unfortunately, these schemes suffer complicated key predistribution, which needs to be carefully designed for thwarting the coalition of vicious nodes and thus results in the network being more fragile. Additionally, most symmetric-key-based solutions become vulnerable to tag pollution attacks. To address this problem, Li and others [9] proposed RIPPLE, an in-network authentication scheme that leverages delayed release of secret keys, as in DART [10] . Although these schemes are considered to be of low complexity to achieve optimal network throughput, they require time asymmetry of level keys, which is not easily realized in distributed settings.
With the observations of the randomization and the linear subspace properties of random network coding, Kehdi and Li [11] proposed an elegant scheme based on null keys, which are simply vectors of the orthogonal space of the linear space spanned by the source vectors. Actually, the scheme can be viewed as a special case of the work of Cai and Yeung [12] . However, the scheme suffers considerable communication overhead since the vectors of orthogonal space must be distributed to all intermediate nodes unimpaired, which requires a great deal of communication and computation. Another drawback of this scheme is the lack of data streaming support since the entire file is needed before sending.
In this letter, we propose an efficient scheme against pollution attacks for network coding inspired by the idea of securing network coding against wiretapping in [12] , in which each transmitted message can be considered as a solution of a public linear system for securing network coding against wiretapping. We inherit and extend this technique for resisting pollution attacks, that is, the elements of each source vector are regarded as the free variables of a secret linear system generated by source secret keys. The proposed scheme demonstrates several advantages in implementation compared to existing symmetric cryptography-based solutions.
II. System and Adversary Model
We consider a typical single source multicast scenario, in which each link is assumed to transport, free of errors, an nlength symbol vector over where is a finite field. The source message is divided into generations, each of which is a subsequence represented as a matrix containing m vectors
The source first creates m augmented vectors (i = 1, 2,..., m) for each generation by prefixing
v with the i-th unit vector of dimension m. Any practical network coding system requires that m is much less than n so that the network overhead of network coding is small. Then, the source sends the random linear combinations of these augmented vectors to its neighboring nodes.
Upon receiving l vectors from inputting links, each intermediate node picks l random coefficients in q and then forwards a vector w (the linear combination of the received l vectors) to the downstream network. The first m symbols of w are considered global encoding coefficients. Note that only vectors from the same generation are encoded. A receiver can recover a generation using Gaussian elimination after receiving m linearly independent vectors belonging to the generation.
F
A forwarding vector w, as illustrated above, is considered valid if it lies in the space spanned by the original augmented vectors v 1 , v 2 ,…, v m . However, in realistic scenarios, there is always an adversary that aims to inject or modify valid vectors, even compromising one or more intermediate nodes (but not all) to launch pollution attacks. Our goal is to provide an efficient defense against these adversaries and prevent pollution attacks that destroy the data of honest nodes.
III. Proposed Homomorphic Subspace MAC Scheme
Definition of Subspace MAC Scheme
Our definition is similar to the model of [7] . A (q, n, m) homomorphic subspace MAC is defined by a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithms: Setup, Sign, Combine, and Verify.
Setup. Input: the basic security parameter 1 k and the system parameters m and n for encoding and authentication. Output: a prime number q and a secret key for each node. Sign. Input: an augmented vector , a generation identity id, and a source key subspace Output: a (vector, tags) pair 
Construction of Subspace MAC Scheme
Based on the above model and definition, we present our construction of a (q, m, n) homomorphic subspace MAC scheme.
Setup. Given the system parameters 1 k , m, n, and q, a key distribution center (KDC) distributes the secret keys of all participants as follows:
(i) KDC generates an r×(N+r) matrix: 
The source computes its secret keys s i =G(sd i ) (i=1, 2,…, r) and then constructs a linear equation system: (ii) Let 1 2 1 2 ( , , , ) ( , , , ); 
Here, is signed as . 
IV. Security Analysis
We assume that each node can accurately determine the generation identity of every forwarding vector. The source can additionally compute a regular MAC (such as HMAC) on the transmitted vectors prior to encoding using network coding as the basic scheme in [7] . Then, the security of the proposed scheme is considered from two aspects.
First, we consider that an adversary tries to forge an illegal vector that can pass verification through the transmission.
A

Theorem 1. For any PPT adversary
, the probability that conducts a successful attack is at most . To forge a valid vector, can randomly choose a vector that is orthogonal to such that
Since there are q N+r-1 different vectors in , thus for any PPT adversary the probability that it wins is On the other hand, may randomly choose a vector such that in which case, the probability that A succeeds is Proof. For the proof concept of the first part, we herein assume that r nodes 1 2 , , , r … z z z θ are compromised at some point, which leads to the secret keys 1 2 (linearly independent with a high probability), all revealed by an adversary . Then, obtains the information of source key subspace 1 2 and can inject any malformed vector if more than r-1 nodes are compromised. The second part of this theorem follows likewise. 
V. Comparison with Existing Schemes
In addition to preventing normal and tag pollution attacks, the proposed scheme provides several significant advantages.
First, the scheme can effectively simplify the key distribution procedure to defeat collusion attacks. Using r source secret keys can be enough to tolerate a compromise of up to r-1 nodes. Works [6] [7] [8] [9] required large numbers of secret keys to achieve comparable security. For example, to defeat a coalition of two nodes, only three secret keys are required for the source rather than at least 49, as in [7] .
Second, the scheme incurs relatively low bandwidth overhead. The online bandwidth overhead per packet includes only r MAC tags, where r is a tunable system parameter. Let denote the size of all participants except the source. In [7] , each packet had to carry no less than MAC tags, which does not scale when the network size is large. Similarly, the bandwidth overhead in [8] was far more than that of the proposed scheme, even when using a double-random key. Owing to a delayed key disclosure running method, [9] , [10] exhibited similar inefficiency issues. The main online computation overhead during the runtime of the scheme is the result of general linear combinations, the basic operations of network coding. More important is that the MAC tag computation and verification operation are fast. For each source vector, the source only needs r tag calculations at the Sign phase, which is far less than that of the schemes in [6] [7] [8] [9] . Only one vector multiplication is performed to verify a forwarding vector at each node. Thus, our scheme is significantly efficient in implementation.
VI. Conclusion
This letter proposed a novel symmetric-key-based subspace MAC scheme against pollution attacks for network coding. Different from traditional solutions, the MAC tags of each source vector are constructed by employing the linear system generated by the source keys. Also, the source key subspace is utilized to effectively simplify the key distribution procedure in the existing schemes. The proposed scheme can resist a coalition of up to r-1 intermediate nodes when r source keys are used, while incurring a relatively low overhead in bandwidth and computation. This threshold-tolerance property is often desired in practical applications.
